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Near-death experiences (NDEs) are profound psychic experiences commonly occurring in
life-threatening conditions. They include feeling a sense of peace, of seeing a bright light,
encountering deceased relatives or religious figures, and of transcending space and time.
To explain them, it has been suggested that they stem from brain disorders and/or psy-
chological reactions to approaching death, a sort of wishful thinking in response to the
perceived threat. This is a report on a case with most of the features typical of NDEs
except that it occurred entirely without any life-threatening conditions. This evidence is
theoretically incompatible with either of the above hypotheses, suggesting that a broader
interpretation of the phenomenon is needed.
Keywords: death studies, body–mind problem, consciousness
INTRODUCTION
Near-death experiences (NDEs) are an intriguing neuroscientific
topic with profound epistemological implications and an increas-
ing number of publications (Greyson, 2007, 2010; Griffith, 2009;
Metzinger, 2009; Terhune, 2009; Facco, 2010; Agrillo, 2011; Mobbs
and Watt, 2011). NDEs may include several perceptions, such as
seeing a bright light, moving through a tunnel, positive emotions,
meeting deceased relatives, communicating with a light, entering
a new domain, reaching a point of no return, reviewing one’s life,
and out-of-body experiences (OBEs). Their incidence has prob-
ably increased due to advances in resuscitation methods. NDEs
are reported in all cultures (Belanti et al., 2008) and, although
a culture-related incidence of some particular features (i.e., “life
review” and tunnel perception) has been described (Kellehear,
1993), the core experience seems to be much the same across
cultures (Greyson et al., 2009). Both psychological and physiolog-
ical interpretations have been suggested (Table 1). Psychological
interpretations are based on the “expectation hypothesis” and
consider NDEs the product of an altered mental state induced
by life-threatening conditions (Blackmore and Troscianko, 1988;
Appleby, 1989; Britton and Bootzin, 2004), their phenomenology
presumably stemming from the projection of beliefs and expec-
tations of an afterlife. It is still not clear, however, how people
suddenly finding themselves in critical conditions (e.g., cardiac
arrest) might be aware of being near-death and have time enough
to develop complex scenarios to suit their wishes. Spiritual and
religious experiences are global human phenomena that have
always occurred down the ages, while the transcultural features of
NDEs (whatever their meaning) appear to be an archetypal expres-
sion of the human mind. This being so, there could be no cultures
completely free of any form of religion, enabling us to verify the
expectation hypothesis: even in countries that have abolished all
forms of creed (like the USSR in the twentieth century), many
people retain a deep religiosity hidden in their psyche.
Other psychological theories focus on several possible aspects
(see Greyson et al., 2009; van Lommel, 2010 for a full review of
these factors), including: (a) depersonalization, i.e., NDEs would
be a sort of profound depersonalization with a subsequent loss
of identity; (b) a feeling of detachment and unreality; (c) disso-
ciation (a defense mechanism to evade a frightening reality, such
as a life-threatening event, which involves a disruption of identity,
memory, and consciousness); (d) personality factors (even though
attempts to identify personality traits correlating with NDEs have
so far remained inconclusive); (e) memory of birth, according to
which a dark tunnel, a bright light, and going toward a new land-
scape would be a recollection of the experience of birth. False
memories have also been suggested, i.e., a sort of attempt made
by the mind to retrospectively fill the gap after a period of uncon-
sciousness (French, 2001). Braithwaite (2008) made the point that
the brain is constantly trying to make sense of the information
it receives so as to preserve a rapid and coherent interpretation
of this information, so NDEs could be seen as patients’ attempts
to make sense of their confusing experience (Mobbs and Watt,
2011).
Neurobiological hypotheses consider NDEs as a by-product of
brain disorders. Altered blood gas levels (i.e., hypoxia or hyper-
capnia) have been suggested by some authors to have a major
role in producing hallucinations, such as tunnel vision and bright
lights (Blackmore,1996); and an abnormal electrical activity (REM
intrusions and epilepsy in the limbic system and temporal lobes)
has been invoked to explain life memory flashbacks (Britton and
Bootzin, 2004; Nelson et al., 2006). It has also been postulated that
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Table 1 | Main reductionist models for explaining NDEs.
Neurobiological hypotheses Psychological hypotheses
Altered blood gas level Expectation
• Hypoxia Depersonalization
• Anoxia Derealization
• Hypercapnia Dissociation
Periphery-to-fovea retinal ischemia Personality
Neurological factors Birth model
• Epilepsy False memories
• Excitotoxic damage (glutamate)
• Neurotransmitter imbalance
• REM-sleep intrusion
• Temporal lobe disorders
• Multisensory breakdown – right angular
gyrus dysfunction
Pharmacological factors
• Opioids
• Steroids
• Ketamine
• Hallucinogens
medication, and neurochemical reactions in general, could affect
the occurrence of NDEs (Mobbs and Watt, 2011), but delirium in
critical care patients (Facco and Rupolo, 2001; Arend and Chris-
tensen, 2009), which is the well-known primary effect of brain
dysfunction and/or drugs, is entirely different from NDEs. Jansen
(1990, 1991) claimed that NDEs might be due to an involvement
of NMDA receptors in neurocritical patients, and this Author also
suggested a link between NDEs and hallucinogens such as keta-
mine (see Facco, 2010, for a review on the subject). On the other
hand, single, witnessed NDE cases (van Lommel et al., 2001) chal-
lenge the reductionist view of human consciousness, pointing to
the awkward idea of a possible transient dissociation between body
and mind.
Some features of NDEs have occasionally been observed in peo-
ple who are not in life-threatening conditions, in whom there
can be no expectations about the hereafter or neurotransmitter
disorders involved. These cases might be related to psychological
disorders, such as autoscopy, but OBEs have distinct features and
do not correspond to the classical definition of autoscopy (Facco,
2010). The main neurophysiological mechanisms behind them
have been elucidated and they can be at least partially reproduced
in healthy subjects (Ehrsson, 2007), while memory flashbacks fol-
lowing temporal lobe stimulation had already been reported in the
mid-twentieth century by Penfield (1955).
To date, little attention has been paid to ascertaining whether
some features of NDE are exclusive to life-threatening condi-
tions. Gabbard and Twemlow (1991) compared OBEs occurring
in life-threatening versus non-critical conditions, failing to find
any feature exclusive to the former. Some NDE components were
more likely in individuals who sensed that death was near (regard-
less of whether their conditions were genuinely life-threatening or
only perceived as such), suggesting a role of expectancy (Gabbard
and Twemlow, 1991), though this can only apply to cases in which
consciousness is preserved.
As far as we know, there have been few reports of profound
NDE-like experiences in people who were not in life-threatening
conditions, but their repeated occurrence would challenge both
the neurobiological and the psychological hypotheses advanced
to explain the pathophysiology of NDEs. Even their name and
definition would have to be reconsidered because it would mean
that these psychic experiences might potentially be perceivable in
everyday life, and their meaning would still be unknown when
they occur unrelated to any psychological disturbances. In this
paper, we report on the case of a person who had a near-death-like
experience in healthy, physiological conditions.
CASE REPORT
The subject was an electrotechnician who came under our observa-
tion because he was trying to understand the meaning of a strange
experience he had had a few years earlier, when he was divorcing
from his wife.
He told the following story:“I was spending my summer holidays
in the mountains with my four-year-old child. I had recently sepa-
rated from my wife; it was a difficult time. One evening, while I was
in the room where we were staying, I suddenly saw a great white light.
It was not dazzling, but its whiteness was unnatural, I mean it did
not seem to be like the white light from natural or artificial sources
we know, nor did it come in from outside. Then, some balls of light
appeared; I did not count them, but there were perhaps five or six,
and they could have been about 1.5 meters in diameter. These balls
were translucent with the same color as the light, but less transparent
and thicker, though I noticed that they did not cast any shadow. At
the time, I had a profound feeling as if all the beings of the world
were within me and, at the same, I felt as if I were within them. The
source of light was ellipsoid. It was Love and Joy, and I felt a sort of
stream through me. I use the term ‘stream’, but it was not so clearly
definable. I cannot use the term ‘wind’, because wind comes from
outside, while I felt this stream inside me. I was so enraptured that I
had stopped breathing. I was fully lucid, however, and realized that
I was not breathing, so I started breathing again, but my breathing
disturbed the vision and, after a few breaths, it vanished.”
The subject reported that he had rejected any form of religion
by that time in his life, as a reaction to having gone to a Catholic col-
lege for a year during his adolescence. His experience had surprised
him because it was different from anything he could imagine. The
experience was very strong and led to a profound transformation.
As a result of it, he overcame any fear of death, which he no longer
saw as a negative event, but as an intrinsic, inseparable part of life,
and of an ineffable divine beyond any conventional concept. Now
he is happy with his new wife, but he is continuing to study in
search of the meaning of his experience, and of life itself. Far from
being fideistic, his stance is rational and agnostic.
The score on the Greyson scale (Greyson, 1983) was 16 and con-
sisted of the following items: (a) vision of a supernatural light; (b)
complete loss of the sense of time; (c) peacefulness; (d) deep joy;
(e) empathic fusion with the whole world; (f) clear perception of
a reality beyond the ordinary world; (g) understanding everything
about the universe; and (h) encounter with entities.
After his experience, he immediately felt the need to write down
his thoughts in the form of a poem, symbolizing the perception
of immanence of an impersonal divine in the world and its loss
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with the exclusive use of logic, reasoning, and erudition. He still
feels that he is unable to really explain his deep experience, with
attendant disappointment; he thinks this is partly due to his lack
of a humanistic background.
DISCUSSION
This was a case of a rather profound empathic–mystic experience.
While the score on the Greyson Scale confirms its intensity and
likeness to an NDE, no cerebral, or psychological disorders, nor
any drug-related effects can explain its occurrence, challenging
any reductionist or mechanistic interpretation of the phenome-
non. The subject had no history of psychological disorders, use
of psychotropic drugs, or substance abuse. On the whole, his life
could be described as completely normal. While he has always been
aware of the oddity of his experience, it has never led him to strike
a fideistic pose; instead, he has continued to have all his doubts
and tried to understand the meaning of the experience.
The present account is consistent with a growing body of
literature on NDEs occurring in the absence of life-threatening
conditions (Holden et al., 2009). van Lommel (2010) summarized
some of the most often recurring circumstances that might prompt
NDEs in subjects with no brain function disorders, including
serious (but not immediately life-threatening) conditions, isola-
tion, depression, existential crisis, meditation, and the so-called
“fear-death experiences”. Another circumstance was described by
Moody and Perry (2010), who reported “shared death experi-
ences” in healthy people attending the moment of death of a close
relative.
Greyson et al. (2009) made the point that, when the recur-
rent features of NDEs are examined one by one, they might be
partially explained by psychobiological factors. In contrast, when
these features occur together, as in classic NDEs, such interpre-
tations appear strained. Indeed, there would seem to be good
reason to propose a broader interpretation of NDEs than the one
encompassed in the reductionist interpretations alone (Facco and
Agrillo, 2012). In a prospective multicenter study on individu-
als experiencing cardiac arrest, van Lommel et al. (2001) found
that only 12% had a core NDE. These Authors claimed that most
of their patients would have had an NDE if these experiences
were due merely to physiological factors, thus calling the mean-
ing generally attributed to them into question. In their sample,
moreover, neither the individual’s physical conditions (duration
of the cardiac arrest, duration of unconsciousness, intubation,
induced cardiac arrest, medication), nor their psychological state
(fear of death, religion, prior knowledge of NDEs) correlated
statistically with the incidence of NDEs, suggesting that psychobi-
ological factors alone are not enough to explain the occurrence of
NDEs.
The perception of undefined entities (not belonging to the
iconography of the subject’s religion) and figures other than
deceased people known to the subject would seem to be incompati-
ble with the expectation hypothesis. NDEs have also been reported
in small children presumably not old enough to have philosophi-
cal concepts or expectations and wishes concerning the hereafter
(Morse et al., 1986). Patients actually nearing death report expe-
riencing a more enhanced cognitive function than others whose
illness or injury does not put their life at risk (Owens et al., 1990).
Here again, this would hardly appear to be compatible with the
reductionist idea of a close dependence of the mind’s function-
ing on the brain, an impairment of the latter implying a parallel
cognitive function impairment.
The time is probably ripe for a reappraisal of the very concept of
NDEs as encompassing spiritual experiences as a whole. Given the
huge number and variety of transcendent experiences reported by
Rankin (2008), there seems to be good reason to do so. We defined
our subject’s experience as “NDE-like” to emphasize both its sim-
ilarities and differences vis-à-vis true NDEs. In this regard, it is
worth noting that advances in our knowledge and classification
of events is context-sensitive, and that is why transcendent expe-
riences seen in the field of emergency medicine have prompted
physicians to name them NDEs and interpret them mainly from a
neurobiological perspective (the experiences reported by terminal
patients have been dubbed “deathbed visions” or “end of life expe-
riences”), while psychologists, philosophers, and religious people
are more inclined to see them as spiritual and religious experi-
ences, observing them outside the context of clinical disease. This
has given rise to a number of diverse phenomena being defined
differently in the context of different disciplines, which have sev-
eral features in common as well as phenomenological differences.
Our patient, whose case belongs to the field of spiritual experi-
ences, sought the authors’ opinion after hearing about the latter’s
interest in NDEs.
All non-ordinary activities of consciousness, in states of brain
dysfunction, psychotic disorders, hypnosis, meditation, ecstatic
and mystical states, and those induced by psychotropic drugs, have
been gathered under the umbrella term of “altered state of con-
sciousness” (ASC) in the science of psychobiology (Vaitl et al.,
2005). This term ASC is questionable, however, at least to some
degree (Facco, in press), because it suggests a priori the idea of a
dysfunction, while some of the states it is meant to describe (e.g.,
meditation and hypnosis) imply no such abnormality.
In short, there is some sort of link between the phenomenology
of NDEs, mystic experiences, the visions of prophets and apos-
tles in the Holy Scriptures, inspiration in poetry, art and music,
meditation, hypnosis, neurological diseases (such as temporal lobe
epilepsy), psychiatric disorders, and the effects of hallucinogens
(see Facco, 2010, as a review on the subject). There may also be
a trait d’union between NDEs, hypnosis, and meditation (Otani,
2003; Facco, in press). Similarly, in the collective imagination there
is a link between genius and madness. The dominant mechanis-
tic and reductionist approach in biomedicine focuses on diseases
and mainly adopts a statistical concept of normality, so it may also
risk misunderstanding the nature of “awkward” expressions of the
mind, taking for a disorder something that is not, especially in the
field of mind expressions and psychiatry (Wakefield, 2010).
The concept of the plausibility of thoughts and experiences has
deep social and epistemological implications too, and depends on
the so-called Zeitgeist (spirit of the time): a vision or premonitory
dream would have been considered normal and even welcome in
the Ancient World, whereas from our modern-day materialistic
viewpoint, their oddity makes us interpret them a priori as false
or possibly related to brain dysfunctions or psychiatric disorders,
thus returning us to the eternal philosophical dilemma of truth
and the mind–brain–world relationship.
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A variety of spiritual experiences correlate with the activation of
a large fronto-parieto-temporal network where the activity of the
left and right parietal systems seems to play a crucial part in tran-
scendence (Urgesi et al., 2010). Religious thinking seems to be asso-
ciated with brain regions relating to emotion, self-representation,
and cognitive conflict, while thinking about ordinary things is
more closely related to memory networks (Harris et al., 2009).
The emerging neuropsychology of spirituality and religion thus
promises to improve our knowledge of its neurocorrelates and
their link with other experiences, such as those induced by hypno-
sis, meditation, and psychotropic drugs, helping us to go beyond
the conventional approach biased by context and a prejudicial idea
of dysfunction.
The“awkward” features of our subject’s experience cannot sim-
ply be passed off as symptoms of a psychiatric disorder; quite
the reverse, the experience yielded positive cognitive effects. The
poem he wrote concisely indicates the same path to enlightenment
as described in Taoism, Buddhism, and Sufism. These disciplines
claim the illusoriness of our ordinary perception of the world
and the need to go beyond the limits of our ego and its log-
ical, conceptual, and dualistic thinking to remove the mask of
illusion, by means of a thorough epistemological and introspec-
tive understanding of the mind’s physiology (Humphreys, 1951;
Sukuki, 1958; Izutsu, 2010). It is surprising that our subject should
have been so in tune with Eastern philosophies, since he had
no philosophical background and had rejected Catholicism (the
only religion he had known, in a stiffly dogmatic version that he
drastically refused).
The transcendental tone of such experiences, belonging to the
realm of the ineffable, is a feature common to our case, to NDEs,
and to mystic experiences, like the OBE-like experiences reported
by Saint Paul (2 Cor. 12, 1–4). The positive nature of their content
and their transforming impact also seem hard to attribute to a
mere result of neurological or psychiatric impairment.
The content of our subject’s experience also closely resembles
the empathogenic and entheogenic component of the effects of
hallucinogens (Nichols, 2004), but there is no chance of such
drugs having a role in our case. On the whole, hallucinogens
generate a variety of experiences depending on several factors,
including the subject’s personality, environment, and the reasons
for using the drug, while NDEs have a stable frame in all cultures
(Belanti et al., 2008; Facco, 2010). It would be worth reconsidering
the role of hallucinogens across the entire history of humanity,
right from prehistoric times, through the Eleusinian Mysteries
in Greece, to the shamanic cultures and native religions, where
such substances have close links with rituals and spirituality –
a usage that is poles apart from the drug abuse of our time in
our culture. The closest connection between NDEs and the prod-
ucts of hallucinogen use reportedly lies in the use of iboga in the
Bwiti religion of Gabon, where this hallucinogen is used in a com-
plex rite of passage that intentionally simulates a NDE (Strubelt
and Maas, 2008). The image of entities in the form of balls of
light as described in our case seems curiously to exist in Mexican
shamanism, at least as in the descriptions in Castaneda’s (1997)
fiction.
Near-death-like experiences could seem to derive from role
transition too (Gabbard and Twemlow, 1991). In our case, the
divorce was the only detectable factor that might have been related
to the experience. We might speculate that such an event involves
a subject in a profound reflection on the existence and might facil-
itate non-ordinary activities of consciousness and trigger this type
of experience. NDE-like experiences can be induced in hypno-
sis as well, and have been proposed as a method for facilitating
both first- and second-order changes in psychotherapy (Schenk,
1999).
The lack of any organic, pharmacological, or psychiatric fac-
tors sorely tries any reductionist interpretation of the nature of
NDE-like experiences and supports the need to reappraise these
phenomena, taking a broader approach. Psychological factors,
such as expectations or fears of death, are likely to have a lim-
ited role too. For the time being, we can only suggest the following
speculations.
a) Apart from any dysfunctions and lesions responsible for
generating symptoms, all brain areas and neurotransmit-
ters potentially involved in these experiences may have an
as yet misunderstood physiology that could provide a com-
mon terrain for all non-pathological visions reported in
all cultures and at all times of human history, spirituality,
and art.
b) Hallucinogens and psychotropic drugs can generate the so-
called ASC, by activating these areas and probably also complex
and as yet little known brain circuits; a broad range of expe-
riences may occur as a result, the content and meaning of
FIGURE 1 | Physiological and pathological contexts giving rise to
NDEs, NDE-like experiences, and non-ordinary experiences of
transcendental tone.These experiences might involve the same brain
areas and neurotransmitters (an example of which is given here), and their
dysfunctions seem to be understood rather better than their physiology. The
latter belongs to the world of spirituality and the highest expressions of the
human mind and culture, and the meaning of these experiences cannot be
reduced a priori to a mere brain circuitry dysfunction simply because they
look awkward from a materialistic perspective.
Frontiers in Psychology | Consciousness Research November 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 490 | 4
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Facco and Agrillo Near-death-like experiences
which are far from being just a by-product of a given substance,
but also depend on the subject’s mind, with profound cultural
implications.
c) Any agent capable of triggering these circuits might yield such
experiences. This may be the case of life-threatening situa-
tions (both organically and psychologically), in psychiatric and
neurological disorders, but also in hypnosis and meditation,
role transitions and, more generally, all deep existential crises
(Figure 1).
d) If this is so, then the term ASC, which has been applied to
both hallucinogens and physiological activities of the mind
(i.e., hypnosis and meditation), might become questionable:
altered already suggests an idea of abnormality, a matter for the
psychiatrist, while state is unsuitable because consciousness is
never a state, but rather a ceaseless processing unit. The term
non-ordinary activity of consciousness would be semantically
more appropriate.
e) The reductionist approach, by aiming to detect which brain
areas and neurotransmitters are involved, can continue to make
an essential contribution to our scientific knowledge, but it is
blind to meanings and values, and the impact of experiences
on real life, which is the other, unavoidable, subjective side of
the coin. Assuming from the start that these awkward expe-
riences are only worthless epiphenomena of brain circuitry
may be misleading because all products of the mind are of the
same nature, including science itself, while their conceivability
and plausibility depend on the paradigm adopted and, more
generally, on the Zeitgeist.
In conclusion, our case of a very uncommon and profound
spiritual NDE-like experience in normal conditions of mental and
physical health challenges the conventional reductionist medical
interpretations of NDEs because it combined oddity with normal
function, and because it revealed cognitively positive effects, which
make it no less than “normal.” It is worth emphasizing that the
Greyson scale may not be a conclusive arbiter of NDEs. Other tran-
scendent experiences that have nothing to do with NDEs might
rate highly on the Greyson scale. The similarities between our
subject’s experience and NDEs suggest that a link exists between
transcendent experiences and NDEs, and that its content has an
archetypal nature that remains to be fully elucidated. Perhaps all
the relevant subjective phenomena belonging to the suspect sphere
of transcendence, spirituality, and possibly also the highest expres-
sions of the mind should be reconsidered from a “physiological”
perspective, including their mechanisms, content, and meanings,
without mechanistic prejudices.
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